Business email compromise investigation in Hong Kong
who changed the bank details, and how.
A supplier's bank details change in an email thread, a payment goes out, and the real supplier never receives it. Business email compromise is one of the most common and costly frauds affecting Hong Kong companies. The first priority is the money; the second is establishing exactly what happened, whose mailbox was involved and who bears the loss.
In short
A business email compromise (BEC) investigation establishes how a fraudster altered or inserted payment instructions: whether a mailbox at your company or your counterparty was taken over, whether a lookalike domain or spoofed address was used, when the fraudster had access, and what they read, sent or hid. The findings can be relied on in police reports, bank recall requests, insurance claims and disputes over who should bear the loss. D3Forensics carries out BEC investigations in Hong Kong; we investigate and report, and do not provide incident response or recovery.
First steps if a payment has gone to a fraudster
- Call your bank immediately and ask for the payment to be recalled. Report to the police at a station or through the e-Report Centre, and call the Anti-Deception Coordination Centre's Anti-Scam Helpline on 18222; the ADCC works with banks to try to stop payments.
- Do not reply to the suspicious email thread. Contact the genuine counterparty by a phone number you already hold, not one in the email.
- Change the password of any mailbox you suspect, sign out all sessions and check that multi-factor authentication is on. Record rules, forwarding and connected apps (screenshot or export) before you remove them, and do not delete messages: they are evidence.
- Ask your IT provider to preserve the Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace audit logs now, before they expire. If your IT provider or an administrator may be involved, call us first instead.
- Keep the original emails in the mailbox; forwarding them or printing them strips the technical details.
What the investigation establishes
- Which mailbox was compromised, if any: yours, your counterparty's, or neither (a spoofed or lookalike domain).
- How access was gained: a phishing page, password reuse, a malicious app granted consent, or multi-factor authentication approved by mistake.
- When the fraudster had access, from where, and what they did: messages read, rules created to hide replies, emails sent, forwarding set up.
- How the fraudulent instructions were made to look genuine: inserted into a real thread, a domain one letter different, or a display name trick.
- Whether other counterparties received fraudulent instructions from the same access.
Whose mailbox was hacked matters
In many BEC disputes the key question is which side's system was compromised, because that often shapes who bears the loss. Both sides tend to assume it was the other. The evidence usually decides it: message headers show which servers handled the fraudulent email, audit logs show sign-ins from unfamiliar locations and the creation of hiding rules, and lookalike domains leave registration and authentication traces. We can examine your side, and where the counterparty co-operates, theirs.
Related services
For detailed email authenticity work, including disputed and altered messages, see our specialist site emailforensics.com.hk. For investigation of the mailbox account itself, see our account takeover investigation page.
How to check a Microsoft 365 mailbox for signs of compromise
Give this list to your IT administrator. Record what you find before changing anything.
- Review the user's sign-in log for sign-ins from unfamiliar countries, devices or browsers, and for failed attempts followed by a success.
- List the mailbox's inbox rules and look for rules that move, delete or mark as read messages containing words like invoice, payment or bank.
- Check for forwarding to an outside address, at mailbox level and in rules.
- Review enterprise applications the user has consented to, and remove unknown ones only after recording them.
- Search the audit log for New-InboxRule, Set-InboxRule and UpdateInboxRules (rule changes), Set-Mailbox (forwarding), Add-MailboxPermission, consent to application and MailItemsAccessed events in the suspect period.
- Check registered multi-factor authentication methods for devices or phone numbers the user does not recognise.
- Export the results and the audit log before the retention period deletes them.
How to verify a change of bank details
Most BEC losses are stopped by this simple control.
- Treat any email changing bank details as unverified, however genuine it looks.
- Call the counterparty on a number held in your supplier records from before the change, never one from a recent email or a web search.
- Ask the person to read the new account details out to you, rather than confirming details you read to them.
- Require a second staff member to approve the change before the first payment.
- Make a small test payment and have it confirmed by phone before sending the full amount.
- Record the verification in the payment file.
More on cyber forensics
This page is part of our cyber forensics in Hong Kong section; technical terms are explained in our cyber forensics glossary. D3Forensics investigates and reports on cyber incidents; we do not provide incident response, containment or system recovery, and we work alongside the people who do.
Business Email Compromise: questions and answers
What is business email compromise?
Business email compromise (BEC) is fraud in which a criminal uses email to impersonate a trusted party, usually a supplier, client, colleague or senior executive, and persuades the victim to send money or sensitive data. The fraudster either takes over a real mailbox or uses a convincing fake address. The most common form in Hong Kong is a change of bank details for an invoice payment.
How do fraudsters insert themselves into a real email thread?
Usually by taking over one of the mailboxes in the conversation, often through a phishing page that captured the password. With access, they read the thread, wait for an invoice, and send altered payment details from the real account or from a lookalike domain copied into the thread. They often create mailbox rules that move the genuine party's replies into an obscure folder so the victim does not see warnings.
How can you tell whose mailbox was hacked, ours or the supplier's?
The technical details of the fraudulent emails and the audit logs answer it. Message headers show which mail servers sent each message and whether it passed SPF, DKIM and DMARC checks. Audit logs show sign-ins from unusual locations or devices, new mailbox rules and forwarding. A lookalike domain points to impersonation rather than a hack of either side. Where we can examine both sides, the answer is usually clear.
Can the money be recovered?
Sometimes, if action is fast. Call your bank and report to the police immediately, and call the Anti-Scam Helpline on 18222; fast reporting can lead to payments being intercepted or held, and a court can grant a freezing (Mareva) injunction against recipients. A forensic investigation does not recover money itself, but it provides the evidence that banks, police and lawyers use in recovery actions and civil claims.
What evidence should we keep after a BEC fraud?
Keep the original emails in the mailbox (not forwarded copies), the mailbox rules and forwarding settings as they were found, Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace audit and sign-in logs, payment records and bank correspondence, and notes of calls with the counterparty. Ask your IT provider to export the audit logs promptly, because they expire.
How long are Microsoft 365 audit logs kept?
It depends on the licence and settings. On many standard Microsoft 365 plans, audit records are kept for around 180 days; premium licences and retention policies can extend this, and some sign-in reports are kept for much shorter periods. Do not rely on the default: export what you need as soon as a compromise is suspected.
Is changing the password enough?
No. Fraudsters often leave rules, forwarding, app permissions or registered devices that survive a password change. Our account takeover investigation page explains what to check and how to record it before removing it.
Can you prove an email was spoofed rather than sent from the real account?
Often. A spoofed or lookalike-domain email has a different sending infrastructure and authentication result from a genuine one, and the genuine account's message trace and audit logs will show no matching activity. The original message file, not a forwarded copy or screenshot, is needed for the analysis.
Who bears the loss in a business email compromise?
That is a legal question that depends on the contract, the facts and the conduct of each party, and you should take legal advice. The forensic facts are often central: whose system was compromised, whether warning signs were visible, and what checks each side made. Our reports set those facts out neutrally.
Should we report BEC to the police in Hong Kong?
Yes. Report as soon as possible, at a police station or through the e-Report Centre, and call the Anti-Deception Coordination Centre's Anti-Scam Helpline on 18222 for advice where money has been sent. A police report is also usually needed for bank and insurance processes.
How do we stop it happening again?
Verify any change of bank details by phone using a number you already hold, require multi-factor authentication on all mailboxes, block automatic forwarding to outside addresses, and publish DMARC records for your domains. The investigation report should explain the specific weakness exploited in your case, which is the most useful guide to what to fix.
Can you give expert evidence in a BEC dispute?
Yes. Where a dispute reaches court or arbitration, we can prepare an expert report under the Rules of the High Court and the Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses. Our overriding duty is to the court, and our opinions do not depend on which party instructs us.
What is a lookalike domain?
A domain registered to resemble a real one, such as a single letter swapped or a different ending (.co instead of .com.hk). Emails from it can pass authentication checks, because the fraudster controls it, so they look technically clean. Spotting the difference often needs close reading of the full address.
Can you tell which messages the fraudster read?
Often, if mailbox auditing was recording access events. In Microsoft 365, MailItemsAccessed records can show individual messages opened by a session; where a mail client synchronised a whole folder, the record shows only that the folder was downloaded, and heavy activity can cause gaps, so the result may be a range rather than a message list. Availability depends on licence and settings. This matters for deciding whether personal or confidential data in the mailbox was exposed.
Is BEC only an email problem?
No. Fraudsters increasingly follow up with phone calls, messaging apps or fake video calls to reinforce the deception, and sometimes use deepfaked voices. The investigation considers every channel used in the fraud.
Talk to us before anything is changed.
A short, confidential call is usually enough to tell you what to preserve, what it will cost and whether a forensic examination is worthwhile. We take instructions from solicitors, companies and individuals in Hong Kong and across the Asia-Pacific region.
Telephone +852 5808 1071 · Signal or WhatsApp +852 9103 1852 · Email enquiries@d3forensics.com · Enquiry form
D3Forensics Limited (BR No. 53603590)Unit 215, Hundsun International Centre, 44 Heung Yip Road
Wong Chuk Hang, Hong Kong
Visits strictly by appointment only.
