What should a company do in the first hours after a malware infection?

By Alan Jeffries, Principal Consultant · Published · Covers the news of the week of 13 July 2026

In July 2026 Nihon Kotsu, Japan’s largest taxi operator, shut down internal systems and isolated its network after what it called unauthorised external access through a malware infection, suspending its online reservations and telephone dispatch. Decisions taken in the first hours of an incident like this shape everything that follows, including whether anyone can later say what happened.

In short

Contain the spread without destroying the evidence: isolate affected systems from the network rather than wiping or rebuilding them, capture logs and, where possible, memory, and record every action with times. Call in incident responders and legal advisers early, decide who speaks for the company, warn customers about impersonation, and keep essential services running by other means. The investigation into cause and scope depends on what was preserved in those first hours.

What was reported

Security Affairs reported on 14 July 2026 that Nihon Kotsu said the incident occurred in the early morning of Saturday 11 July and disclosed it on 13 July, describing it as “unauthorized external access (malware infection)”. As an emergency containment measure the company shut down internal systems and isolated its network; its online hire-car reservations and telephone taxi dispatch were suspended, and customers were directed to a ride-hailing app, taxi stands or the street. The company said “no information leak has been confirmed”, that it was working with external experts on cause and scope including log analysis, and warned customers about emails or messages impersonating it.

We draw no conclusions about the company beyond its published statements. Shutting systems down can be the right decision to stop malware spreading, and we do not know what evidence was captured first. Its statement that no leak “has been confirmed” is the careful kind of wording we recommend.

The first hours

  • Contain without wiping. Disconnect affected systems from the network, but do not reformat or rebuild them until evidence is captured. If a system is actively encrypting or deleting data and cannot be isolated, get specialist advice immediately; stopping the damage may come first.
  • Capture what disappears. Memory, running processes and network connections vanish at shutdown; logs roll over. Have your responders collect them early, and reset privileged and administrator passwords.
  • Keep a log of actions. Who did what, when and why. It protects the investigation and the decisions later.
  • Check your insurance, then call specialists and lawyers. Many cyber policies require prompt notice and the insurer’s approved responders. Then incident responders for the technical work; legal advisers for notification, insurance and privilege, which may sometimes cover the investigation if it is properly structured.
  • Keep the business running. Manual workarounds and alternative channels, as here, buy time to investigate properly.
  • Warn customers. Attackers and opportunists often send messages impersonating the affected company.

The common mistakes

Restoring from backup before knowing how the attacker got in, so they return; wiping machines that held the only evidence; and announcing that no data was taken before the evidence supports it. The last is the hardest to undo, because a later correction does more damage than a careful first statement.

See how the entry point is traced and testing a data-theft claim.

Sources

Security Affairs, 14 Jul 2026: Malware hits Japan's largest taxi company Nihon Kotsu

This article is general commentary on public reports, not legal advice and not a finding about any organisation named in those reports. Facts are as reported at the time of writing.

Frequently asked questions

What should we do in the first hours after a malware infection?

Isolate affected systems from the network without wiping them, capture logs and memory, record every action, call in incident responders and lawyers, keep essential services running by other means, and warn customers about impersonation.

Should we switch off infected computers?

Usually disconnect them from the network instead. Switching off loses memory evidence, although sometimes it is needed to stop encryption spreading; take specialist advice on each system.

Can we restore from backup straight away?

Not until you know how the attacker got in and that the backup is clean. Otherwise the attacker may simply return.

Should we say no data was taken?

Only when the evidence supports it. Say what is known, what is being investigated and when you will update, rather than making a statement you may have to correct.

Who should we call first?

Check your cyber insurance policy first: many require prompt notice to the insurer and use of its approved responders. Then call incident responders and legal advisers. The police and regulators may also need to be told, depending on the case and the jurisdiction.

Talk to us before anything is changed.

A short, confidential call is usually enough to tell you what to preserve, what it will cost and whether a forensic examination is worthwhile. We take instructions from solicitors, companies and individuals in Hong Kong and across the Asia-Pacific region.

Telephone +852 5808 1071 · Signal or WhatsApp +852 9103 1852 · Email enquiries@d3forensics.com · Enquiry form