How can you tell from your logs if customer accounts were hit by credential stuffing?

By Alan Jeffries, Principal Consultant · Published · Covers the news of the week of 31 August 2026

At the end of August 2026 South Korea’s privacy regulator announced a fine of more than 12.8 billion won against the retailer GS Retail over credential-stuffing attacks that, as reported, ran for well over a year. Credential stuffing rarely needs a clever exploit. It leaves its traces in the login logs most companies already keep, which is why the useful question is whether anyone is looking.

In short

Look for patterns, not single events: many logins from one IP address or a small group of addresses (though attackers often spread attempts across hundreds or thousands of addresses), a surge in failed logins, high failure rates across many different accounts, successful logins from new locations or devices followed quickly by changes to contact details, points or payment settings, and automated timing. Keep login logs long enough to look back, and have someone review them. If an attack is still running, preserve the logs, block the sources and force password resets on affected accounts. A forensic review can then work out, as far as the logs allow, which accounts were actually accessed rather than merely tried.

What was reported

Edaily reported on 31 August 2026 that the Personal Information Protection Commission had decided on 26 August to fine GS Retail 12.836 billion won, plus a 3 million won penalty. According to the report, credential-stuffing attacks hit the GS Shop and GS25 services between June 2024 and February 2026, affecting 1,660,153 people. The report said the GS25 breach was detected on 4 January 2026 and the GS Shop breach in February, that the leak continued until 13 February, and that 327 of the IP addresses used against GS25 were also used against GS Shop.

The regulator’s findings, as reported, included that there were no controls to block mass logins from a single IP address, that a surge in failed logins went unnoticed, and that a further 1,599 affected people identified later were not notified within 72 hours. We rely on the published report, which is a translation, and draw no wider conclusions about the company.

What credential stuffing looks like in the logs

Credential stuffing uses usernames and passwords leaked from other services. Because many people reuse passwords, some attempts succeed. In the logs, the signs are usually:

  • Volume across many accounts. Many login attempts, across many accounts, from one address or a rotating set of addresses. Attackers often spread attempts across hundreds or thousands of addresses to stay under per-address limits, so also look at overall failure rates and many accounts tried from one device or browser signature.
  • High failure rates. A sudden rise in failed logins, often for accounts that do not exist.
  • Machine timing. Attempts at regular intervals or speeds no person could manage.
  • What happens after success. Changes to email, phone number, delivery address or payment details, or points redeemed, soon after a login from a new device or place.

Working out who was affected

An attempted login is not the same as an accessed account. A forensic review separates accounts that were only tried, accounts where the password worked, and accounts where the attacker then viewed or changed data, as far as the logs allow. That distinction drives notification, customer messaging and any regulatory response. It depends on the logs being kept and being complete; where they are not, the honest answer may be a range rather than a number.

See how access logs decide who was affected and why breaches are often found late.

Hong Kong position

As at November 2026, the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance does not impose a general legal duty to notify the PCPD of a data breach, although the PCPD encourages notification. Sector regulators, the critical infrastructure computer systems law (Cap. 653), contracts, insurance policies and overseas laws may impose their own duties. Take legal advice on your own position.

Sources

Edaily, 31 Aug 2026: GS Retail fined over credential stuffing

This article is general commentary on public reports, not legal advice and not a finding about any organisation named in those reports. Facts are as reported at the time of writing.

Frequently asked questions

How can we tell from our logs if customer accounts were hit by credential stuffing?

Look for many logins across many accounts, whether from a few addresses or spread across many, a surge in failed logins, machine-like timing, and changes to contact or payment details soon after logins from new devices. Then have a forensic review separate, as far as the logs allow, accounts that were only tried from those actually accessed.

What is credential stuffing?

An attack that tries usernames and passwords leaked from other services, relying on people reusing passwords. It needs no software vulnerability in your own system to succeed.

How long should we keep login logs?

Long enough to look back over the period an attack could plausibly run, which in reported cases has been many months. Keep them complete and protected from alteration, and do not keep personal data in logs longer than necessary.

Does a failed login mean the account was breached?

No. A forensic review distinguishes accounts that were only tried, accounts where the password worked, and accounts where data was then viewed or changed.

Is credential stuffing a notifiable breach in Hong Kong?

As at November 2026, the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance does not impose a general legal duty to notify the PCPD of a data breach, although the PCPD encourages notification. Sector regulators, the critical infrastructure computer systems law (Cap. 653), contracts, insurance policies and overseas laws may impose their own duties. Take legal advice on your own position.

Talk to us before anything is changed.

A short, confidential call is usually enough to tell you what to preserve, what it will cost and whether a forensic examination is worthwhile. We take instructions from solicitors, companies and individuals in Hong Kong and across the Asia-Pacific region.

Telephone +852 5808 1071 · Signal or WhatsApp +852 9103 1852 · Email enquiries@d3forensics.com · Enquiry form