# Ransomware forensic investigation in Hong Kong

> A ransomware forensic investigation establishes, from preserved computers, servers and logs, how the attackers gained access, what they did while inside, how long they were present, whether data was exfiltrated, and which data and people are affected. It is separate from recovery: D3Forensics investigates ransomware attacks in Hong Kong and reports on them, while your IT or incident response provider contains the attack and restores the systems.

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Primary question this page answers: ransomware forensic investigation Hong Kong

Last updated: 2026-11-17

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Whether you are in the middle of an attack or the systems are already back, the hard questions remain. How did the attackers get in? How long were they inside? Did they really copy data out, as the ransom note claims, and whose data was it? A ransomware forensic investigation answers those questions from the evidence, for the board, the insurer, the Privacy Commissioner and, if needed, a court.

## If you are being attacked now

- Need someone to stop an attack now? D3Forensics does not do that. Call the breach hotline in your cyber insurance policy, which often includes an approved response firm, or your IT provider. HKCERT (8105 6060) gives free advice to Hong Kong businesses and individuals. If money has been sent, call your bank first, then report to the police and call the Anti-Deception Coordination Centre's Anti-Scam Helpline on 18222.
- Disconnect affected computers from the network, but do not switch them off or wipe them.
- Report to the police.
- Keep the ransom note exactly as it is, and do not contact the attackers.
- Then follow the step-by-step guide below to preserve evidence during recovery.

## What the investigation establishes

- Initial access: the entry point, such as an exposed remote desktop service, a VPN account without multi-factor authentication, an unpatched internet-facing system, or a phishing email.
- How long they were inside (dwell time): the earliest attacker activity the surviving evidence shows, often well before the encryption that made the attack visible. Earlier access may not have been recorded.
- How they moved around (lateral movement and privilege): which accounts were used, how administrator rights were obtained, and which systems were reached.
- Whether data was copied out (exfiltration): how (for example with cloud storage or file transfer tools), roughly how much, and from where.
- Scope of affected data: which folders, databases and mailboxes were accessed, and whose personal data they hold.
- Back doors seen in the evidence (persistence): signs of attacker accounts or tools in the material examined, passed to your recovery team. This is not a check that the network is clean, which is for your IT or incident response provider.

## Verifying a data theft claim

Ransomware groups routinely claim to have stolen data, sometimes truthfully, sometimes to increase pressure. The claim can be tested. File samples published or sent by the attackers can be matched against your systems; logs can show large outbound transfers, archive creation and the use of transfer tools; and the folders the attackers touched can be compared with what they say they hold.

The answer is rarely a simple yes or no. A careful report will say what was accessed, what was probably copied, and what cannot be determined from the surviving records, so that notification decisions rest on facts rather than on the attacker's word.

## Who the findings are for

Boards need to know what went wrong. Insurers need a defensible account of the cause and scope. The Privacy Commissioner, sector regulators and affected customers need to know what personal data was involved. Lawyers need findings that will hold up if there is a claim. Every report rests on the same findings; only the level of detail changes for the reader, and drafts and distribution are agreed with your lawyers.

## How to preserve evidence during ransomware recovery

Recovery and evidence can coexist if these steps are built into the plan from the start.

1. Photograph or save the ransom note exactly as it appears, and record the file extension added to encrypted files.
2. Identify the first machine known to be affected and set it aside unaltered.
3. Preserve domain controllers, file servers and any server with remote access, by imaging or by keeping the disks.
4. Export firewall, VPN, remote desktop gateway and endpoint security logs before they roll over.
5. Record every recovery action with the time, so it can be separated from attacker activity in the timeline.
6. Restore from backups onto new or wiped hardware, choosing restore points that predate the earliest attacker activity found. The earliest evidence of access is not necessarily the first access, so no forensic finding certifies a backup as clean.
7. Do not contact the attackers yourself; leave any negotiation decision to your lawyers and insurer.

## How to read a ransomware leak-site claim

When a group posts your company's name, these checks show how seriously to take it.

1. Do not visit the leak site from company systems; ask your investigator to capture the listing, its date and any countdown.
2. Note the volume and categories of data the attackers claim to hold.
3. Compare any sample file names or screenshots with your own folder structure.
4. Check the claim against the investigation's evidence of which systems and folders were accessed.
5. Look for signs of recycled data from an earlier, unrelated breach.
6. Record conclusions as accessed, probably taken, or not supported, with the reasons for each.

D3Forensics investigates and reports on cyber incidents; we do not provide incident response, containment or system recovery.

## Questions and answers

### What is a ransomware forensic investigation?

It is a forensic examination of the systems and logs involved in a ransomware attack to establish how the attackers got in, what they did, how long they were present, whether they took data and which data was affected. It is evidence-led and documented so that its findings can be relied on by insurers, regulators and courts. It is not the recovery itself: restoring systems is the job of your IT or incident response provider.

### How do investigators find out how ransomware got in?

By working backwards from the encryption through the evidence the attackers left. Windows keeps several records of logons and of which programs were present and ran; remote access and VPN logs show where connections came from; and email and web logs can show a phishing message or a malicious download. (For specialists: event logs, Prefetch where enabled, Amcache and file system records, correlated with endpoint security data where it exists.)

The entry point is usually one of a short list: remote desktop exposed to the internet, a VPN or remote access account without multi-factor authentication, an unpatched internet-facing system, stolen credentials, or a phishing email. The task is to prove which one, with records.

### How long are ransomware attackers usually inside before they encrypt?

It varies widely, from hours to months. Many attacks follow a pattern of initial access, then reconnaissance, privilege escalation and data theft, and only then encryption, which is the visible part. Establishing the first date of access matters because it sets the period for which data may have been exposed and the logs that need to be examined.

### The attackers say they stole our data. How do we know if that is true?

Test the claim against the evidence. Have your investigator, not your staff, capture and compare any samples the attackers publish or send with your own files; look in logs for large outbound transfers, archive creation (for example 7-Zip or WinRAR) and transfer tools (for example rclone or file-sharing services); and identify which folders and servers the attackers accessed.

A claim can be true, exaggerated or false. Some groups republish old leaks or data from another victim. The investigation should state what was accessed, what was probably taken and what cannot be determined.

### Should we pay the ransom?

That is a business and legal decision, not a forensic one, and it should be taken with your lawyers, insurer and, where appropriate, the police. Payment does not guarantee working decryption or the deletion of stolen data, and payments can raise money-laundering and sanctions questions. The forensic findings help: knowing whether data was really taken, and whether clean backups exist, changes the decision.

### Can we still investigate if systems have already been rebuilt?

Often, partly. Even after rebuilding, evidence may survive in backups, in cloud and email audit logs, on firewalls and VPN appliances, in endpoint security consoles, on machines that were not reimaged, and in the attackers' own communications. What is lost is usually the detail from the rebuilt machines themselves. The sooner we are involved, the more can be saved, but it is rarely too late to establish something.

### What should we keep for the investigation?

Keep affected disks or forensic images of them, especially the first machine known to be hit and key servers such as domain controllers and file servers; exports of firewall, VPN, remote access and endpoint security logs; cloud and email audit logs; the ransom note and attacker communications; and a written log of recovery actions with times. Ask your IT provider to stop log rotation and automatic deletion. If in doubt, keep it and ask us.

### Do we have to tell the Privacy Commissioner about a ransomware attack?

As at November 2026, notifying the PCPD of a data breach under the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance is recommended rather than mandatory, and the PCPD's guidance strongly recommends prompt notification where there is a real risk of significant harm. The duty to protect personal data still applies, and the PCPD can investigate. Sector regulators, critical infrastructure rules and contracts may make reporting compulsory. Take legal advice. The forensic investigation provides the facts any notification relies on: what personal data was affected and whose.

### Can you tell us which customers were affected?

Usually, to a degree that depends on the logs. Once the investigation identifies which systems, databases and folders the attackers accessed or copied, the data in those locations can be reviewed to identify the individuals and the types of personal data involved. Where logging is limited, the honest answer may be a range, and we explain the basis for it.

### Will the investigation tell us who the attackers were?

It can often link an attack to a known ransomware group from the ransom note, the leak site, the tools and the methods used. Identifying the individuals behind a group is a matter for law enforcement. Our reports set out what is known about the attacker and how confident that is, without overstating it.

### How does a ransomware forensic investigation help with insurance?

Insurers need to understand the cause, scope and timeline of an incident to assess a claim, and many require a forensic report. A clear, evidence-based report helps the claim proceed and reduces disputes about cause. Check your policy before appointing anyone: some insurers must approve the firm or have a panel.

### What does a ransomware forensic investigation cost?

It depends on the number of systems and the questions. After a scoping call we quote a fixed fee for preservation and give a written estimate for the analysis before work starts. We never work on contingency or success fees.

### What is double extortion?

Double extortion is when attackers both encrypt systems and steal data, then threaten to publish the data unless paid. It means a working backup does not end the incident: the question of what data was taken still needs answering for notification and legal purposes.

### Can the investigation help identify which backups predate the attack?

It can help, by establishing the earliest attacker activity the surviving evidence shows and whether the attackers touched the backup systems. Earlier access may not have been recorded, so a restore point before that date is not guaranteed to be clean, and no forensic finding certifies a backup. Your IT or incident response provider decides on restoration.

### What are the most common ways ransomware gets into Hong Kong companies?

Commonly: remote desktop or remote access services exposed to the internet, VPN accounts without multi-factor authentication, unpatched internet-facing devices such as firewalls and VPN appliances, and stolen credentials bought from information-stealing malware. Phishing remains a route too. The investigation identifies which applied in your case.

### Should we tell customers before the investigation is finished?

Sometimes it is right to notify early, with what is known and a promise to update, especially where there is a real risk of harm. Your lawyers will advise. The investigation can provide interim findings, clearly labelled, to support early communication without overstatement.

## Instruct us

Telephone +852 5808 1071; Signal or WhatsApp +852 9103 1852; email enquiries@d3forensics.com; enquiry form https://digitalforensics.com.hk/#contact
